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Background
The European Patent Convention (EPC),3 the law
which governs the granting of patents throughout
much of Europe, stipulates that computer programs are
not patentable ‘as such’. The relevant part of the EPC,
Article 52, reads as follows:
(1) European patents shall be granted for any inventions,
in all fields of technology, provided that they are new,
involve an inventive step and are susceptible of industrial
application.
(2) The following in particular shall not be regarded as inven-
tions within the meaning of paragraph 1:
(a) discoveries, scientific theories and mathematical
methods;
(b) aesthetic creations;
(c) schemes, rules and methods for performing mental
acts, playing games or doing business, and programs
for computers;
(d) presentations of information.
(3) Paragraph 2 shall exclude the patentability of the subject-
matter or activities referred to therein only to the extent
to which a European patent application or European
patent relates to such subject-matter or activities as such.4
The deletion of the exclusion from patentability of
computer programs was considered and rejected when
the EPC was most recently revised in 2000.5 Thus com-
puter programs (as such) remain unpatentable under
the EPC—except that they are not apparently unpatent-
able in the view of the European Patent Office’s Techni-
cal Board of Appeal (TBoA) 3.5.01. For example, the
following is a claim in a European patent which was
granted following a successful appeal6 by the patent
applicant, IBM, to TBoA 3.5.01:
A computer program comprising program code means for
performing all the steps of any one of the claims 1 to 13
[these are claims to a method of resource recovery in a
computer system] when said program is run on a
computer.7
This is a claim to a computer program as such, if the
words ‘as such’ are given their normal and common
sense meaning. However, the examiners of patent
applications in the EPO should apply the EPC as inter-
* The views expressed are those of the author and not of his firm. Email:
jcockbain@dehns.com
1 Depending on your point of view, a lovable or irritating blue-skinned
humanoid in Belgian cartoons ,http://www.smurf.com/smurf.php/www/
home/en. accessed 2 June 2010.
2 G-3/08 Programs for computers. Not yet published, ,http://documents.
epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
DC6171F182D8B65AC125772100426656/$File/G3_08_Opinion_12_05_
2010_en.pdf. accessed 2 June 2010.
3 European Patent Office, Convention on the grant of European patents
(European Patent Convention) (13th edn European Patent Office, Munich
2007).
4 European Patent Office, above, n 5 at 80.
5 The EPC before revision is referred to as EPC 1973, and after revision as
EPC 2000. European Patent Office, above, n 3, sets out the text of EPC
2000.
6 T-1173/97 Computer program product/IBM [1999] OJ EPO 609.
7 EP-B-457112, claim 20.
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Key issues
† The Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBoA) of the
European Patent Office in May 2010 handed
down its opinion2 on a referral by the former
President of the EPO, Alison Brimelow, on the
patentability of computer-related inventions,
more particularly computer programs.
† The EBoA refused to accept the referral and in
so doing, in our opinion, overrode the correct
interpretation of the ‘as such’ provision of
Article 52(3) of the European Patent Convention
(EPC), requiring that interpretation to be sup-
plemented by an interpretation which has no
basis in the legislative history of the EPC, and
even extended that unsupported interpretation
in such a way as to reduce further the effects of
the exclusions from patentability found in
Article 52(2) EPC.
† As we argue in this article, this leaves the pos-
ition even more unclear as to the proper basis
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preted by the Boards of Appeal, even when such
interpretation appears illogical, and problematic results
may therefore occur.
A computer program is a set of instructions which,
when followed by a computer, causes an effect. For
example, an image processing computer program may
cause the computer to transform a raw image data set
(pixel coordinates plus pixel intensity plus pixel colour:
x, y, i, c) into an enhanced image. We illustrate this
with reference to the smurfs of this paper’s title. One
program might serve to detect the blue skin in an
image of a smurf and change the pixel colour to mauve
to yield an image of a mauve-skinned (i.e. sun-tanned)
smurf. This, we suggest, is an example of a program
performing a technical function to produce only an
aesthetic effect. By contrast, another program operating
on the same data set might yield a dual data set which,
when the image is viewed through appropriate glasses,
appears to present the blue-skinned smurf in 3D: this
exemplifies a program again performing a technical
function but to produce a technical effect.8
However, the examiners of patent applications in
the EPO should apply the EPC as interpreted by
the Boards of Appeal, even when such interpret-
ation appears illogical, and problematic results
may therefore occur
When traded, a computer program is always associated
with, loaded onto, a carrier, eg a CD-ROM. Thus
potential patent claims to a computer program might
read as follows:
1. A computer program comprising program code
which when run on a computer and applied to the
data set for a smurf image causes the data set for a
corresponding sun-tanned smurf image to be gener-
ated.
2. A CD-ROM having recorded thereon a computer
program comprising program code which when run
on a computer and applied to the data set for a
smurf image causes the data set for a corresponding
sun-tanned smurf image to be generated.
3. A computer program comprising program code
which when run on a computer and applied to the
data set for a smurf image causes the data set for a
corresponding 3D smurf image to be generated.
4. A CD-ROM having recorded thereon a computer
program comprising program code which when run
on a computer and applied to the data set for a
smurf image causes the data set for a corresponding
3D smurf image to be generated.
Before commenting on the interpretations of Article
52(2) and (3) EPC in the decisions which prompted
the referral to the EBoA, we should make it clear that
we consider the exclusion from patentability of compu-
ter programs inappropriate; TBoA 3.5.01 has ‘simply’
been trying to find ways to limit the effect of this inap-
propriate exclusion. Computer programs can be highly
technical and innovative products which, when run,
achieve highly desirable technical effects. There is no
apparent reason why this area of technology should be
discriminated against on the ground that inventions
made within it simply are not patentable inventions.
Moreover, since it has been settled law for decades9
that Article 52(2) EPC has nor excluded from patent-
ability methods involving the use of computer pro-
grams and computers under operational control by
computer programs, this field of technology is not
regarded as a whole as outside the ambit of patents.
The topic of this article is not the appropriateness of
the exclusion but rather, given its retention in EPC
2000, the manner in which it should be interpreted and
given effect. To this end, the following statements
should be borne in mind:
[C]omputer programs as such, independent of [a practical
application] . . ., are not patentable [under the EPC] irre-
spective of their content, i.e. even if that content happened
to be such as to make it useful.10
This statement of TBoA 3.5.01 supports the appropri-
ateness of a normal common sense approach to inter-
preting the words ‘as such’ in Article 52(3) EPC.
Since the only conceivable use for a computer program is
the running of a computer, the exclusion from patentabil-
ity of programs for computers [under the EPC] would be
2 G-3/08 Programs for computers. Not yet published, ,http://documents.
epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
DC6171F182D8B65AC125772100426656/$File/G3_08_Opinion_12_05_
2010_en.pdf. accessed 2 June 2010.
8 While some readers may consider both programs to produce only
aesthetic effects or both to produce technical effects, we ask them to
accept our interpretation in order for visualize concrete examples of
programs with and without technical character. Some programs must, for
EPC purposes, be void of technical character or the exclusion of Art
52(2) EPC would be without effect, which cannot be the case.
9 See, for example, T-208/84 Computer-related invention/VICOM [1987]
OJ EPO 14.
10 T-204/93 System for generating software source code components/AT&T,
at para 3.13, ,http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/
t930204eu1.htm. accessed 2 June 2010.
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effectively undermined if it could be circumvented by
including in the claim a reference to conventional hard-
ware features, such as a . . . memory . . . , which, in practice
are indispensible if the program is to be used at all.11
In this later statement, TBoA 3.5.01 suggested that the
exclusions from patentability should not be avoidable
simply by the skill of the patent attorney in drafting
the claims, in other words that the exclusions must be
construed to have some ‘teeth’.
To restrict the application of [a provision of the EPC
excluding certain matters from patentability] . . . to what
the applicant chooses explicitly to put in his claim would
have the undesirable consequence of making avoidance of
the patenting prohibition merely a matter of clever and
skilful drafting of such claim.12
Those words, articulated recently by the EBoA, the
EPO’s highest instance, appear to confirm TBoA
3.5.01’s previous intuitive understanding that exclu-
sions should not simply be emasculated.
[EPO] boards of appeal cannot assume the role of legis-
lator. They have to apply the law as it stands and cannot
strive to meet wishes which are incompatible with the pro-
visions of the European Patent Convention.13
This is a comment by Paul van den Berg, former chair-
man of TBoA 3.5.01 and a long-standing member of
the EBoA. The comment predates the decisions from
TBoA 3.5.01 which are at the centre of the G-3/08
referral but seems to identify correctly the constraints
under which the EPO Boards of Appeal should
operate.
[I]t by no means follows that because of pressure from
applicants, the grant of patents for excluded categories
should be allowed or that excluded categories (particularly
. . . computer programs) should be construed narrowly.
Just as with arms, merely because people want them is not
sufficient reason for giving them.14
Paul van den Berg’s previous words are thus fully sup-
ported here by Lord Justice Jacob of the England and
Wales Court of Appeal.
The decisions of the EPO Boards of Appeal are mutually
contradictory. To say that is not to criticise anyone. On the
contrary the Boards of Appeal have each done what they
think is right in law - as befits tribunals exercising a judi-
cial function. But the time has come for matters to be
clarified by an Enlarged Board of Appeal.15
This comment also from Jacob LJ supports the argu-
ment that the G-3/08 referral was timely and that a
thorough review and clarification was desirable as to
the legal basis for accepting or rejecting claims directed
explicitly or indirectly to excluded subject matter.
T-1173/97 Computer program products/IBM16
and T-424/03 Clipboard formats
I/MICROSOFT17
We have discussed elsewhere18 the development by the
EPO’s TBoAs of the case law relating to the patentabil-
ity of computer-related inventions; that development is
not the subject of this article. However, the TBoAs have
developed two current approaches to the manner in
which Article 52(2) EPC may exclude computer pro-
grams from patentability: the ‘technical character’
approach and the ‘any hardware’ approach.
These approaches replaced the earlier ‘contribution’
approach, which in our opinion was incorrect.19 That
approach is best illustrated by what we term a ‘mixed
media’ claim, in which the invention is defined as the
combination of two components, one of which is
excluded from patentability by Article 52(2) EPC
and the other of which is not excluded, for example ‘A
CD-ROM [not excluded] having recorded thereon a
computer program [excluded]’. Under the ‘contri-
bution’ approach, the novelty and inventiveness of the
claimed subject-matter overall could not derive from
the excluded component. Thus, CD-ROMs being
known, the claim would be rejected.
T-1173/97 IBM may be regarded as the magnum
opus of TBoA 3.5.01, the EPO’s first clear computer
program-specific exposition of its currently dominant
approach to the exclusions from patentability of Article
52(2) and (3) EPC, the ‘technical character’ approach.
Under this reasoning, Article 52(2) EPC serves only to
exclude subject-matter which has no ‘technical charac-
ter’, by virtue of the meaning accorded to the words ‘as
11 T-38/86 Text processing/IBM [1990] OJ EPO 384, at para 25.
12 G-2/06 Use of embryos/WARF [2009] OJ EPO 306, at 326.
13 Paul van den Berg, ‘Patentability of Computer-software Related
Inventions’ in Members of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the EPO, The
law and practice of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent
Office during its first ten years (Carl Heymanns, Cologne 1996) 45.
14 Lord Justice Jacob, in Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings & Ors [2006] EWCA
Civ 1371, at para 19.
15 Lord Justice Jacob, above, n 14, at para 25.
16 T-1173/97 Computer program products/IBM, above, n 6. [Hereinafter
T-1173/97 IBM.]
17 T-424/03 Clipboard formats I/MICROSOFT. [Hereinafter T-424/03
MICROSOFT.] ,http://legal.european-patent-office.org/dg3/biblio/
t030424eu1.htm. accessed 2 June 2010.
18 Sigrid Sterckx and Julian Cockbain, ‘The Patentability of Computer
Programs in Europe: An Improved Interpretation of Articles 52(2) and
(3) of the European Patent Convention’ (2010) 13 JWIP 366–402.
19 The ‘contribution’ approach would have the undesirable effect of
rendering many beneficial technological advances unpatentable. See
Sterckx and Cockbain, above, n 18, at 375–6.
Julian Cockbain and Sigrid Sterckx . Sun-tanned or 3D smurf? ARTICLE 3 of 8
 by guest on February 6, 2011
jiplp.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
such’ in Article 52(3) EPC.20 Thus, in the ‘technical
character’ approach, if a computer program has no
technical character (eg the smurf sun-tanning
program), it is a computer program as such and so is
excluded by Article 52(2) EPC. By contrast, if a compu-
ter program has ‘technical character’ (eg the smurf
3D-ing program), it is not a computer program ‘as
such’ and so is not excluded by Article 52(2) EPC.
However, if this is the meaning of ‘as such’ in Article
52(3) EPC, it must equally apply to all the other
subject-matter and activities listed in Article 52(2)
EPC, for example discoveries and presentations of
information. Moreover, the requirement for an inven-
tion to have ‘technical character’ is not present in the
EPC and Pila21 has argued convincingly that it was
clearly not intended by the legislators responsible for
the wording of EPC 1973.
TBoA 3.5.01, in T-1173/97 IBM, stated that ‘compu-
ter programs are not excluded from patentability [by
Art. 52(2) EPC] under all circumstances’.22 The patent
application considered by TBoA 3.5.01 in T-1173/97
IBM was duly granted as EP-B-457112 with the claim
to the computer program which we described above.
This ruling made it plain that, where a computer
program did not have technical character, not only
would claims to it as a program be excluded by Article
52(2) EPC, but so too would be claims to it on a
carrier, eg a CD-ROM: ‘with regard to the exclusions
under Article 52(2) and (3) EPC, it does not make any
difference whether a computer program is claimed by
itself or as a record on a carrier’.23
TBoA 3.5.01, with a different set of appeal board
members, created, or rather confirmed, the second, ‘any
hardware’, approach to the exclusions of Article 52(2)
EPC in T-424/03 MICROSOFT, handed down more
than seven years later.24 Under this approach, which we
consider correct, the prohibition of Article 52(2) EPC is
avoided where the subject matter of the claim does not,
in itself, fall within one of the categories excluded ‘as
such’. Thus a claim to a CD-ROM carrying a computer
program is a claim to a CD-ROM, not a claim to a com-
puter program as such, so cannot be excluded by Article
52(2) EPC. Under this approach, mixed media claims as
mentioned above are not excluded by Article 52(2) EPC.
Let us return to the smurf claims listed above:
1. A computer program comprising program code which
when run on a computer and applied to the data set
for a smurf image causes the data set for a correspond-
ing sun-tanned smurf image to be generated.
2. A CD-ROM having recorded thereon a computer
program comprising program code which when run
on a computer and applied to the data set for a
smurf image causes the data set for a corresponding
sun-tanned smurf image to be generated.
3. A computer program comprising program code
which when run on a computer and applied to the
data set for a smurf image causes the data set for a
corresponding 3D smurf image to be generated.
4. A CD-ROM having recorded thereon a computer
program comprising program code which when run
on a computer and applied to the data set for a
smurf image causes the data set for a corresponding
3D smurf image to be generated.
Under the ‘technical character’ test of T-1173/97 IBM,
claims 1 and 2 would be excluded by Article 52(2) EPC
since the program of these claims has an aesthetic
rather than technical effect, while claims 3 and 4 would
not be excluded since the program there has a technical
effect. Under the ‘any hardware’ test of T-424/03
MICROSOFT, claims 2 and 4 would not be excluded
by Article 52(2) EPC since they are directed to a
CD-ROM, which is something that is simply not
excluded by Article 52(2) EPC. Here one should
appreciate that, to be patentable, such claims would
still have to pass the tests for novelty, inventive step,
and industrial applicability.
An important question is therefore whether these
‘technical character’ and ‘any hardware’ tests are
alternative or accumulative? If the former, there is
clearly a divergence in the case law since claim 2
would pass one test but fail the other. If the latter,
two different meanings are given to the words ‘as
such’ in Article 52(3) EPC, something for which
there is no basis, and again there is clearly a diver-
gence in the case law.
20 ‘Technical character’ cannot be something that a computer program
inherently possesses as otherwise the exclusion of Art 52(2) EPC would
be without effect. Technical character, in the context of computer
programs must therefore mean achieving in operation a technical effect
which must be other than the effects implicit to the operation of all
computer programs.
21 Justine Pila, ‘Dispute over the meaning of “invention” in Article 52(2)
EPC - the patentability of computer-implemented inventions in Europe’,
36 IIC 173–91 (2005).
22 T-1173/97 Computer program products/IBM, above, n 6, at para 9.4.
23 T-1173/97 Computer program products/IBM, above, n 6, at para 13.
24 TBoA 3.5.1 almost reached this point in its earlier decision T-931/95
Pension Benefit Systems where it concluded in consideration of a claim
to a computer that ‘An apparatus constituting a physical entity or
concrete product suitable for performing or supporting an economic
activity, is an invention within the meaning of Article 52(1) EPC.’
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The EPO President’s referral
While the President referred four questions to the
EBoA, we are here concerned only with questions 1
and 2(a) as these most clearly highlight the interpret-
ation of ‘as such’ in Article 52(3) EPC:
1. Can a computer program only be excluded as a compu-
ter program as such if it is explicitly claimed as a com-
puter program?25
2. (a) Can a claim in the area of computer programs avoid
exclusion under Art. 52(2)(c) and (3) merely by expli-
citly mentioning the use of a computer or a computer-
readable storage medium?26
Sticking rigidly to the wording of these questions,
under the ‘technical character’ doctrine as expressed in
T-1173/97 IBM, the answers to both questions are ‘no’.
Under the ‘any hardware’ doctrine of T-424/03
MICROSOFT, the answers to both questions are ‘yes’.
Clearly there is a divergence.
The President’s referral was made under Article
112(1)(b) EPC which reads as follows:
In order to ensure uniform application of the law, or if a
point of law of fundamental importance arises: . . . the Pre-
sident of the European Patent Office may refer a point of
law to the Enlarged Board of Appeal where two Boards of
Appeal have given different decisions on that question.27
The EPO President’s referral28 in relation to the first
question drew attention to T-1173/97 IBM and T-424/
03 MICROSOFT. Since there was a divergence in the
approaches to the interpretation of ‘as such’ in these
decisions and the answers that would have been
resulted from the questions, the referral should clearly
have been admitted and answered. Unfortunately, and
in our opinion incorrectly, the conclusion reached by
the EBoA was that the referral was inadmissible.
Further shortcomings of the EBoA’s Opinion
Whether or not the EBoA was correct in law in reject-
ing the President’s referral on grounds other than the
existence or otherwise of a divergence in EPO case law
is not the subject of this article but has been commen-
ted on extensively by Pila29 who argues that, other than
on those grounds, the referral was also incorrectly
deemed inadmissible.
The EPO is tasked with applying the EPC in examin-
ing patent applications and granting or refusing to
grant European patents and in examining oppositions
to granted European patents and maintaining or revok-
ing the opposed patents. The decisions made may be
appealed to a Board of Appeal, of which there are
many, each focusing on a particular subject matter
area. The Boards of Appeal are essentially courts and,
in interpreting the EPC, they inevitably develop the
law. Since the Boards of Appeal are not bound by each
other’s decisions, each may disagree with the others.
To achieve clarity, a Board may refer a point of law to
the EBoA, which may include members of the Boards
of Appeal and may additionally include members who
are judges in national courts of EPC member states.
If the EPO’s President becomes aware of Board of
Appeal decisions which appear to involve conflicting
interpretations of the EPC, (s)he too may refer the rel-
evant point of law to the EBoA for clarification. The
ability of the President to do this, however, might seem
to threaten the independence of the Boards of Appeal
and the EBoA may refuse such referrals if it considers
that there is no divergence in the supposedly conflict-
ing decisions. It has done that before in G-3/95 Inad-
missible referral.30
In the present case, over the years, TBoA 3.5.01 had
developed a comfortable legal fiction allowing it to
sidestep the exclusion from patentability of computer
programs (an exclusion which, while we consider it
inappropriate, was nonetheless retained when the EPC
was revised in 2000). To that legal fiction, the ‘technical
character’ approach, TBoA 3.5.01 later added a differ-
ent test, the ‘any hardware’ approach. For the EBoA to
reject the President’s referral, it would have to argue
either (1) that T-1173/97 IBM and T-424/03 MICRO-
SOFT were not decisions of ‘two Boards of Appeal’ but
of only one, even though their members were different,
or (2) that the ‘technical character’ and ‘any hardware’
approaches were not divergent and no point of law of
fundamental importance had arisen. The first option
would have been difficult to adopt since in at least one
earlier decision the EBoA had accepted a referral relat-
ing to decisions from the same TBoA but with different
members.31
An arguable point of law of fundamental importance
was the manner in which computer-related inventions,
and in particular computer programs, might be patent-
25 G-3/08 Programs for computers, above, n 2, at para 10.
26 G-3/08 Programs for computers, above, n 2, at para 11.
27 European Patent Office, above, n 3, at 138.
28 Alison Brimelow, letter of 22 October 2008 to Peter Messerli, chairman of
the EBoA ,http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
DC6171F182D8B65AC125772100426656/$File/G3_08_en.pdf. accessed 2
June 2010.
29 Justine Pila, ‘Software patents, separation of powers, and failed
syllogisms: a cornucopia from the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the
European Patent Office’, University of Oxford Legal Research Paper Series
No. 48/2010, ,http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1612518. accessed 2 June 2010.
30 G-3/95 Inadmissible referral [1996] OJ EPO 169.
31 G-1/04 Diagnostic methods [2006] OJ EPO 334.
Julian Cockbain and Sigrid Sterckx . Sun-tanned or 3D smurf? ARTICLE 5 of 8
 by guest on February 6, 2011
jiplp.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
able in view of the wording of Article 52(2) and (3)
EPC. While computer programs are protected by copy-
right, its protection is weaker than patent protection.
In the early decades of the development of today’s large
scale computer industry, computer programs were
widely believed to be unpatentable, which may have
been a contributing factor to the explosive nature of
that development. To quote from Bill Gates of Micro-
soft: ‘If people had understood how patents would be
granted when most of today’s ideas were invented and
had taken out patents, the industry would be at a com-
plete standstill today’.32
To understand the manner in which the EBoA has
apparently resolved the divergence between the two
decisions, it is helpful to consider the example which
the Board gives in paragraph 10.6, namely ‘A cup carry-
ing a picture’, ie a mixed media claim to the combi-
nation of cup (known but not excluded) and picture
(new but excluded, eg as an aesthetic creation). In the
final section of this paragraph, the EBoA states:
According to the approach laid down by T 1173/97 [IBM],
for the purposes of Article 52(2) EPC the claimed subject
matter has to be considered without regard to the prior
art. According to this view a claim to a cup is clearly not
excluded from patentability by Article 52(2) EPC. Whether
or not the claim also includes the feature that the cup has
a certain picture on it is irrelevant. This approach, at least
as formulated in . . . T 424/03 [MICROSOFT], has been
characterised . . . as the ‘any hardware’ . . . approach’
If we substitute CD-ROM for cup and computer
program for picture, we get to the conclusion that no
claim to ‘a CD-ROM having recorded thereon a com-
puter program’ can be rejected under Article 52(2)
EPC. This is indeed the ‘any hardware’ approach of T-
424/03 MICROSOFT. However, it is the CD-ROM and
not the program that saves the claim from Article
52(2) EPC just as it is the cup rather than the picture
in the EBoA’s example. In this approach, the computer
program need not have any technical effect for the
claim to avoid exclusion under Article 52(2) EPC.
However, this is not the approach in T-1173/97 IBM,
which considered some computer programs (and claims
to such programs on a carrier) to be excluded from
patentability by Article 52(2) and (3) EPC. In paragraph
10.2.3, the EBoA acknowledged this to be the case:
Since the [T-1173/97 IBM] Board had come to the con-
clusion that some programs, claimed alone, are excluded
from patentability, it must follow from this statement that
such a program claimed ‘as a record on a carrier’, i.e. on a
computer-readable medium, would also be excluded.
The misrepresentation by the EBoA of T-1173/97 IBM
in paragraph 10.6 of its decision lies in considering the
effect of T-1173/97 IBM to reside in the replacement of
the ‘contribution’ approach by a ‘technical character’
approach in which the words ‘as such’ in Article 52(3)
EPC are interpreted to mean that no claim having a
feature which in use has technical effect can be rejected
under Article 52(2) EPC, ie by a ‘technical character’
approach that extends beyond that approach as
expressed in T-1173/97 IBM.
To understand the manner in which the EBoA has
apparently resolved the divergence between the two
decisions, it is helpful to consider the example
which the Board gives
The EBoA acknowledged that it did find a divergence
between T-1173/97IBM and T-424/03 MICROSOFT.
This is identified in paragraph 10.7.2:
Thus finally the [T-424/03 MICROSOFT] Board had
arrived at a conclusion which clearly contradicted the pos-
ition (or rather one of the positions) taken in T 1173/
97[IBM]. T 1173/97 [IBM] declared, ‘Furthermore the
Board is of the opinion that with regard to the exclusions
under Article 52(2) and (3) EPC, it does not make any
difference whether a computer program is claimed by itself
or as a record on a carrier. . .’ . . . whereas T 424/
03[MICROSOFT] stated, ‘The subject-matter of claim 5 has
technical character since it relates to a computer-readable
medium, i.e. a technical product involving a carrier. . .’.
In attempting to reconcile this notable difference, the
EBoA found that the T-1173/97 IBM TBoA had not
fully appreciated the effect of its new ‘technical charac-
ter’ approach. The EBoA considered that the T-1173/97
IBM Board had failed to realize that a carrier would
have had technical character and thus that the mixed
media claim could not be rejected. That realization,
still according to the EBoA, came with T-424/03
MICROSOFT. Thus according to the EBoA, the ‘any
hardware’ approach of T-424/03 MICROSOFT is not to
ask whether the claim is to something not listed in
Article 52(2) EPC (ie carrier rather than program) but
to ask whether any feature of the claimed subject-
matter has technical character.
32 Quoted in F Washofsky, ‘The Patent Wars: The Battle to Own the World’s
Technology (Wiley, New York 1994) 170.
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TBoA 3.5.01, in T-424/03 MICROSOFT, expressed
what we see to be the correct form of the ‘any hard-
ware’ approach in relation to a method claim:
Even though a method, in particular a method of operat-
ing a computer, may be put into practice with the help of
a computer program, a claim relating to such a method
does not claim a computer program in the category of a
computer program. Hence, present [method] claim 1
cannot relate to a computer program as such.33
Here we consider that the TBoA, giving the words ‘as
such’ their normal and common sense meaning, cor-
rectly interpreted Article 52(3) EPC in accordance with
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties,34 a treaty the EBoA has long considered itself
obliged to follow.
That ‘technical character’ is a separate matter from
the test for whether subject-matter is excluded ‘as such’
by Article 52(2) EPC, is made clear by TBoA 3.5.01 in
T-424/03 MICROSOFT when it continues from the
passage quoted immediately above to comment that it
also considers the claimed method steps to contribute to
the technical character of the invention.35
The EBoA’s extension of T-1173/97 IBM’s ‘technical
character’ approach arises from its consideration of
whether the additional presence of excluded subject
matter in addition to a feature with technical character
could render a claim rejectable under Article 52(2)
EPC. In this regard, the EBoA found that, if a claim to
the technical feature alone (eg cup or CD-ROM) was
acceptable, its limitation by recitation of a further
feature could not make the claim rejectable: ‘In the
case law of the Boards of Appeal there has never been
any suggestion that narrowing a claim can bring it
under the exclusions of Articles 52(2) and (3) EPC’.36
However, this is at odds with the EPO case law on
claims to plants and animals—a claim to ‘a plant with
blue flowers’ is non-excluded but one to ‘a rose plant
with blue flowers and of variety X’ is excluded.37
The distinction between the T-1173/97 IBM ‘techni-
cal character’ test, the T-424/03 MICROSOFT ‘any
hardware’ test, and the EBoA’s extended version of the
‘technical character’ test may best be illustrated by con-
sidering a piece of paper carrying spots of dry ink
arranged to provide a set of smurf names. This might
be claimed as ‘dry ink’ or ‘spots of dry ink arranged to
provide a set of smurf names’, ie this latter claim being
drawn to a presentation of information which as such
is excluded under Article 52(2) EPC.
Under the IBM ‘technical character’ test, the first of
these claims is not rejectable under Article 52(2) EPC
(as ink has technical character), but the second is
rejected under Article 52(2) EPC since the subject
matter of the claim as a whole (information) has no
technical character. Under the MICROSOFT ‘any hard-
ware’ test, since the first claim is not to a presentation
of information as such it is not rejected under Article
52(2) EPC. The second claim should, however, be
rejected under Article 52(2) EPC since it is not to the
combination of excluded (no technical character) and
non-excluded (data carrier) but is as a whole to a pre-
sentation of information (which incidentally has no
technical character). Under the EBoA’s extended
interpretation of the ‘technical character’ test, since the
first claim to the ink cannot be rejected under Article
52(2) EPC, then neither too can the more limited
claim to the ink in an information-presenting arrange-
ment.
The EBoA’s approach overrides the (in our view
correct) ‘any hardware’ approach by causing technical
character to be required. Moreover, it upholds the
unsupported ‘technical character’ doctrine, which it
effectively extends to deny all effect to the Article 52(2)
EPC exclusions of presentations of information and of
computer programs at least.
By ‘at least’ we would include, for example, the exclu-
sion of discoveries. Consider the case of a blue fluor-
escent sand newly found in Bavaria, but usable in its
natural state as an alternative to a child’s night light. In
use it has technical effect and thus could be claimed as
‘blue fluorescent sand’ (ie a claim covering a product of
nature in the form in which it exists in nature). Even US
patent law would reject such blue sand (as well as
arrangement-of-ink) claims as non-statutory subject-
matter.38
33 T-424/03 Clipboard formats I/MICROSOFT, above, n 17, at para 5.1.
34 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, in United Nations
Treaty Series, vol. 1155, 331, ,http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/
instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. accessed 6 June 2010.
35 T-424/03 Clipboard formats I/MICROSOFT, above, n 17, at para 5.2
(emphasis added).
36 G-3/08 Programs for computers, above, n 2, at para 10.8.6.
37 See T-19/90 Onco-mouse/HARVARD [1990] OJ EPO 476; T-315/03
Transgenic animals/HARVARD [2006] OJ EPO 15; G-1/98 Transgenic
plants/NOVARTIS II [2000] OJ EPO 111. In this context, to determine
whether a second claim is a limited version of the first, it is necessary
only to determine whether everything encompassed by the second must
also be encompassed by the first. Thus all rose plants are plants, and all
rose plants with blue flowers are plants with blue flowers, and so on.
38 See, for example, the discussion of the non-statutory nature of ‘printed
matter’ in Debra Greenfield, ‘Intangible or embodied information: The
non-statutory nature of human genetic material’, 25 Santa Clara
Computer & High Tech L J 467 (2009), at 512–8, and Sweet DJ’s
discussion of the non-patentability of products of nature in Association
for Molecular Pathology et al v United States Patent and Trademark Office
et al., 702 F. Supp. 2d 181 (SDNY 2010).
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‘Technical character’ and ‘field of technology’
Shortly before TBoA 3.5.01 gave its decision in T-1173/
97 IBM, the WTO-TRIPS Agreement had come into
effect bringing the requirement, in Article 27(1), that
patents be available for inventions ‘in all fields of tech-
nology’. This requirement, which was not present in
EPC 1973, only came into force for the EPO when EPC
2000 came into effect in December 2007 since the
words ‘in all fields of technology’ had been inserted
into Article 52(1) EPC to achieve TRIPS compliance.
In T-1173/97 IBM, the TBoA commented that:
‘although TRIPS may not be applied directly to the
EPC, the Board thinks it appropriate to take it into
consideration’.39
We suggest that the IBM ‘technical character’
approach is an attempt to import the requirement of
TRIPS Article 27(1) into EPO case law, without full
appreciation of unintended side-effects, and that, just as
the EBoA40 has recently declared Swiss-type use claims41
to be redundant and no longer permissible following the
amendment of the EPC to allow purpose-limited
product claims for second indications, so too should the
‘technical character’ test have been discarded as redun-
dant following the entry into force of the amended
version of Article 52(1) EPC in December 2007.
Perverse and unintended
By focusing on the divergence between the conclusions
of T-1173/97 IBM and T-424/03 MICROSOFT on the
ability of Article 52(2) EPC to exclude claims to a
‘carrier carrying a computer program’, rather than on
the conclusion of T-1173/97 IBM that a claim to a
computer program as such could escape Article 52(2)
EPC by an interpretation (to our minds a perverse
interpretation) of the words ‘as such’ in Article 52(3)
EPC, the EBoA failed to notice the true divergence
between T-1173/97 IBM and T-424/03 MICROSOFT,
namely that one uses the perverse interpretation of ‘as
such’ and the other uses the normal common sense
interpretation.
In attempting to show that the two decisions did
not differ dramatically, the EBoA has ended up not
only (to our minds) misrepresenting the T-1173/97
IBM decision, but also extending the perverse
interpretation of ‘as such’, with the perhaps unintended
consequence of emasculating much of the effect that
Article 52(2) EPC was clearly intended to have. As the
former chairman of TBoA 3.5.01 and member of the
EBoA, Paul van den Berg, stated in 1996:
[EPO] boards of appeal cannot assume the role of legis-
lator. They have to apply the law as it stands and cannot
strive to meet wishes which are incompatible with the pro-
visions of the European Patent Convention.42
Equally, as Pila concluded in a 2010 paper:
The only hope is for the European or national Legislatures
to recognize that ‘judiciary-driven legal development’
within the EPO has met its limits, with the result - as the
[EBoA] itself suggested - that ‘it is time for the legislator
to take over’.43
While the authors approach the interpretation of
Article 52(2) and (3) EPC from the position of the life
sciences rather than that of computer science, the ‘as
such’ provision is applicable to all the subject matters
listed in Article 52(2) EPC and must take the same
meaning for all. Computing is not an exceptional case
for the interpretation of patent law.
39 T-1173/97 Computer program product/IBM, above, n 6, at para 2.3.
40 G-2/08 Dosage regime/ABBOTT RESPIRATORY. Not yet published,
,http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/eponet.nsf/0/
1c9976e4866080a2c12576cf00417e3e/$FILE/G2_08_en.pdf. accessed 6
June 2010.
41 Claims of the format ‘use of drug X for the manufacture of a
medicament for use in method of medical treatment Y’. Such claims were
permitted for so-called second medical indications, where a known drug
was found to be useful in a new medical treatment—claims to a new
method of medical treatment itself not being acceptable under the EPC.
42 Paul van den Berg, above, n 13.
43 Justine Pila, above, n 29 at 17 (footnotes omitted).
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